The revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action by Wu, Haoyang
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The revelation principle fails when the
format of each agent’s strategy is an
action
Wu, Haoyang
Wan-Dou-Miao Research Lab
15 November 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104237/
MPRA Paper No. 104237, posted 26 Nov 2020 13:10 UTC
The revelation principle fails when the format
of each agent’s strategy is an action
Haoyang Wu ∗
Wan-Dou-Miao Research Lab, Room 301, Building 3, 718 WuYi Road,
200051, Shanghai, China.
Abstract
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice
function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents’
private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function can be
implemented by a mechanism in equilibrium, then there exists a direct mechanism
that can truthfully implement it.
This paper aims to propose a failure of the revelation principle. We point out that
in any game the format of each agent’s strategy is either an informational message
or a realistic action. The main result is that: For any given social choice function,
if the mechanism which implements it has action-format strategies, then “honest
and obedient” will not be the equilibrium of the corresponding direct mechanism.
Consequently, the revelation principle fails when the format of each agent’s strategy
is an action.
Key words: Mechanism design; Revelation principle.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1–3], there are one designer
and some agents labeled as 1, · · · , I. 1 Suppose that the designer would like
to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for
each possible profile of agents’ types, and each agent’s type is modeled as his
privacy. In order to implement a social choice function in equilibrium, the
∗ Corresponding author.
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1 In this paper, the designer is always denoted as “She”, and the agent is denoted
as “He”.
designer constructs a mechanism which specifies each agent’s feasible strategy
set (i.e., the allowed actions of each agent) and an outcome function (i.e., a
rule for how agents’ actions get turned into a social choice).
The revelation principle is an important theorem in mechanism design theory.
It asserts that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism
in equilibrium, then it is truthfully implementable. So far, there have been
several criticisms on the revelation principle: Bester and Strausz [4] pointed
out that the revelation principle may fail because of imperfect commitment;
Epstein and Peters [5] proposed that the revelation principle fails in situations
where several mechanism designers compete against each other. Kephart and
Conitzer [6] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless and misreport-
ing is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.
Different from these criticisms, this paper aims to propose another failure of
the revelation principle. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyses
the distinction of two formats of strategy, Section 3 proposes the main result,
i.e., the revelation principle fails when each agent’s strategy is action-format.
Section 4 draws conclusions. Notations about mechanism design theory are
given in Appendix, which are cited from MWG’s book [1].
2 Two formats of strategy
Note 1: In any game, the format of each agent’s strategy is either an infor-
mational message or a realistic action. 2
Example: Practically, only in some restricted cases (such as chess, war simu-
lation game and so on) can each agent’s strategy be described as pure informa-
tion and represented by an informational message (e.g., the strategy in a war
simulation game is message-format, since it contains abstract plans of player-
s). On the other hand, in many realistic cases each agent’s strategy cannot be
described as pure information but must be described as a realistic action (e.g.,
the strategy in a real war is action-format, since it contains military actions
of armies).
Another interesting example is the auction. At first sight each bidder’s bid
is pure information and looks like a message-format strategy. However, in
2 Although Note 1 looks simple, it is not trivial. The reason why we emphasize the
two formats of strategy is that the revelation principle does not hold for the case
of action-format strategies, as will be discussed in Section 3. For simplification, in
the following discussions we simply assume that in any game each agent’s strategy
is of the same format, i.e., we omit the case in which some agents’ strategies are
message-format and other agents’ strategies are action-format.
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many practical cases, only the bid information itself is not enough to be a
full strategy in the auction. Besides announcing a message-format bid, each
bidder must perform a realistic action (e.g., paying money to the auctioneer)
in order to really win the auction. Hence, in many practical cases, an auction
is indeed a game with action-format strategies.
Next, we will deeply investigate the two formats of strategy respectively.
2.1 Case 1: Mechanism with message-format strategies
Definition 1: A message-format strategy of an agent in a mechanism is a
strategy represented by an informational message. The information contained
in the message is the strategy itself, which does not need to be carried out
realistically. For example, let us consider a chess game, then each player’s
message-format strategy is his informational plan about how to play chess.
Definition 2: Given a social choice function f , suppose a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements it in equilibrium with message-format strate-
gies. To clearly describe the case of message-format strategies, we denote each
strategy set Si as Mi, and each agent i’s strategy function as mi(·) : Θi → Mi,
where Θi is agent i’s type set. The outcome function g(·) is denoted as
gm(·) : M1 × · · · ×MI → X, where the input parameters are message-format
strategies and X is the set of outcomes. Hence, the mechanism Γ is denoted as
Γm = (M1, · · · ,MI , gm(·)). The game induced by Γm is denoted as Gm, which
works in a one-stage manner:
Step 1: By using the strategy function mi(·), each agent i with private type
θi send message mi(θi) to the designer.
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Step 2: The mechanism Γm yields the outcome gm(m1(θ1), · · · ,mI(θI)).
Definition 3: Suppose the game Gm has an equilibrium, denoted as m
∗(·) =
(m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)). Consider this equilibrium, there is a direct compound map-
ping from agents’ possible types θ̂ = (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) ∈ Θ into the outcome
gm(m
∗(θ̂)), which is equal to f(θ̂). Based on the direct compound mapping,
we construct a direct mechanism Γ̄m = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , gm(m
∗(·))).
Definition 4: The direct mechanism Γ̄m induces a one-stage direct game Ḡm
as follows:
Step 1: Each agent i with private type θi individually reports a type θ̂i ∈ Θi
to the designer. Here, each agent i does not need to be “honest”, i.e., θ̂i can
be different from agent i’s private type θi.
Step 2: By using the equilibrium strategy functionsm∗(·) = (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)),
3 In the following discussions, in order to clearly specify the private type of each
agent i, we denote it as θi, and any possible type of agent i is denoted as θ̂i ∈ Θi.
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the direct mechanism Γ̄m calculates m
∗(θ̂) = (m∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I)), and then
yields the outcome gm(m
∗(θ̂)).
Note 2: It should be emphasized that the calculated results are pure infor-
mation, and hence are message-format too. Actually, only when each agent
i’s strategy mi(·) is message-format will the calculated results m
∗(θ̂) be legal
message-format parameters of the outcome function gm(·).
Note 3: By Definition 3, m∗(·) = (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)) is the equilibrium of
the game Gm. Then each agent i with private type θi finds m
∗
i
(θi) to be
the optimal choice given that all other agents send m∗
−i
(θ−i). Therefore, in
the direct game Ḡm, each agent i will find truth-telling θ̂i = θi to be the
optimal choice given that the others agents tell the truth θ̂−i = θ−i, and
the final outcome is gm(m
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, for the case
of message-format strategies, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the direct game Ḡm. Consequently, the revelation principle holds when each
agent’s strategy is message-format.
2.2 Case 2: Mechanism with action-format strategies
Definition 5: An action-format strategy of an agent in a mechanism is a
strategy represented by a realistic action, which should be performed by him-
self practically. For example, let us consider a tennis game, then each player’s
strategy is his realistic action of playing tennis, but not any informational plan
of how to play tennis.
Definition 6: Given a social choice function f , suppose a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements it in equilibrium with action-format strategies.
To clearly describe the case of action-format strategies, we denote each strat-
egy set Si as Ai, and each agent i’s strategy function as ai(·) : Θi → Ai. The
outcome function g(·) is denoted as ga(·) : A1×· · ·×AI → X, where the input
parameters are action-format strategies. Hence, the mechanism Γ is denoted
as Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)). The game induced by Γa is denoted as Ga, which
works in a one-stage manner:
Step 1: By using action-format strategy functions (a1(·), · · · , aI(·)), agents
1, · · · , I with private types (θ1, · · · , θI) perform the action-format strategies
(a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI)).
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Step 2: The mechanism Γa yields the outcome ga(a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI)).
5
4 For the case of action-format strategies, the designer observes the performance
of each agent’s action. As a comparison, for the case of message-format strategies,
the designer receives each agent’s message.
5 If in the mechanism Γa some agent i only declares a message about how to perform
an action but does not realistically perform it, then this declaration is meaningless.
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Definition 7: Suppose the game Ga has an equilibrium, denoted as a
∗(·) =
(a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)). Consider this equilibrium, there is a compound mapping
from agents’ possible types θ̂ = (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) ∈ Θ into the outcome ga(a
∗(θ̂)),
which is equal to f(θ̂). Based on the compound mapping, we construct a direct
mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·)).
Definition 8: According to Myerson [2], the direct mechanism Γ̄a induces a
multistage direct game Ḡa as follows:
Step 1: Each agent i with private type θi individually reports a type θ̂i ∈ Θi.
Here each agent i does not need to be “honest”, i.e., θ̂i can be different from
agent i’s true type θi.
Step 2: The designer returns a suggestion to each agent i, here the suggestion
is just the message-format description of action a∗
i
(θ̂i) ∈ Ai. In order to specify
the suggestion’s format more clearly, we denote the suggestion as am
i
(θ̂i);
Step 3: Each agent i individually performs an action âi ∈ Ai. Here each agent
i does not need to be “obedient”, i.e., âi can be different from a
m
i
(θ̂i).
Step 4: After observing that all actions â1, · · · , âI have been performed, the
direct mechanism Γ̄a yields the outcome ga(â1, · · · , âI).
Note 4: Consider Step 1 in Definition 8, each agent reports a type to the
designer, either honestly or dishonestly. Note that choosing to be honest or
dishonest is each agent’s private choice, and cannot be verified by the designer.
Hence, no agent is willing to disclose his privacy unless truth-telling is his
strictly optimal choice. Put differently, if the outcome of truth-telling is not
superior but only equivalent to the outcome of false-telling, then each agent will
certainly prefer false-telling, because false-telling always protects his privacy.
Note 5: Consider Step 3 in Definition 8, after receiving the designer’s sugges-
tion each agent performs an action, either obediently or disobediently. Note
that choosing to be obedient or disobedient is each agent’s open choice and
can be directly observed by the designer. However, in the framework of mech-
anism design theory, the designer is not a dictator, i.e. she can neither control
any agent’s decision nor punish any agent. Therefore, no agent is willing to
be disobedient unless obeying the designer’s suggestion is his strictly optimal
choice.
3 Main results
Consider the multistage direct game Ḡa induced by the direct mechanism Γ̄a
described in Definition 8. According to Myerson [2], the strategy “honest and
obedient” is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Ḡa: i.e., each agent i
not only honestly discloses his private type in Step 1 (i.e., θ̂i = θi), but also
obeys the designer’s suggestion in Step 3 (i.e., âi = a
m
i
(θi)). However, in this
5
section we will point out that Myerson’s conclusion will not hold when each
agent’s strategy is of an action format.
Proposition 1: For a given social choice function f(·) : Θ → X, suppose there
is a mechanism that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each
agent’s strategy is of an action format. Then f will not be truthfully imple-
mentable, i.e., in the multistage direct game induced by the corresponding
direct mechanism, “honest and obedient” will no longer be the equilibrium
strategy.
Proof: Suppose the mechanism Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)) implements the social
choice function f(·) : Θ → X in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each
agent’s strategy is of an action format. By Definition 6 it induces a one-stage
game Ga, the equilibrium of which is denoted as a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)),
and ga(a
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, there is a corresponding direct
mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))) given by Definition 7 and a direct
game Ḡa given by Definition 8. In Step 1 of the direct game Ḡa, there are
different cases for agents 1, · · · , I.
Case 1: Each agent is honest
Consider each agent i chooses to be “honest” in Step 1 of Ḡa (i.e., θ̂i = θi), then
in Step 2, the suggestion to each agent i will be am
i
(θi). Since the equilibrium
of Ga is a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)), then the optimal choice of each agent i in
Step 3 is to be “obedient” (i.e., obeying the suggestion am
i
(θi) and performing
the action a∗
i
(θi)), given that the others also choose to be “obedient”. In Step
4, the final outcome will be ga(a
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Case 2: One agent is dishonest and the others are honest
Consider there is one agent i that wants to protect his privacy and choos-
es to be “dishonest”, and the others still choose to be “honest” in Step 1
(i.e., θ̂i ̸= θi, θ̂−i = θ−i). Then in Step 2, the suggestion to agent i will be
am
i
(θ̂i) ̸= a
m
i
(θi), and the suggestions to the others will still be a
m
−i
(θ−i).
Since the equilibrium of Ga is a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)), then the optimal
choice of agent i in Step 3 will be “disobedient” (i.e., not obeying the sug-
gestion am
i
(θ̂i) but still performing the action a
∗
i
(θi)). The optimal choices of
other agents will be “obedient” (i.e., performing a∗
−i
(θ−i)).
By Note 5, although in Step 4 the designer can find that agent i is disobedi-
ent, she cannot punish him. The direct mechanism Γ̄a will yield the outcome
ga(a
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
It can seen from Case 1 and Case 2 that no matter whether agent i chooses to
be “honest” or “dishonest” in Step 1 of the direct game Ḡa, he will always per-
form the action a∗
i
(θi) in Step 3, because everyone knows the equilibrium of Ga
is a∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)). Obviously, compared with “honest”, “dishonest”
will be strictly beneficial to agent i, since he always protects his private type
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but obtains the same outcome ga(a
∗(θ)) as yielded in Case 1. Furthermore,
Case 2 can be generalized to everyone as follows.
Case 3: Each agent is dishonest
Consider each agent i chooses to be “dishonest” in Step 1 (i.e. reporting a
false type θ̂i ̸= θi), and then chooses to be “disobedient” in Step 3 (i.e., not
obeying the suggestion am
i
(θ̂i) but performing the action a
∗
i
(θi)). Thus, the
final outcome is ga(a
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. As a result, f is dishonest-
ly implemented by the direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))). Note
that in Case 3 each agent’s private type is protected. Thus, Case 3 is strictly
attractive to each agent.
To sum up, when the format of each agent’s strategy is an action, “honest
and obedient” will no longer be the equilibrium strategy of the corresponding
direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))). Hence the revelation principle
does not hold when each agent’s strategy is action-format. ✷
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose that in any game there are two formats of strat-
egy (i.e., an informational message or a realistic action). In Section 2.1 we
point out that the revelation principle holds when each agent’s strategy is of
message format. However, when each agent’s strategy is of an action format,
in the multistage direct game induced by the direct mechanism, “honest and
obedient” will no longer be the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the
revelation principle fails when each agent’s strategy is of action format.
Appendix: Notations and Definitions
Let us consider a setting with one designer and I agents indexed by i =
1, · · · , I. Each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines his pref-
erence over elements in an outcome set X. The set of possible types for agent
i is denoted as Θi. The vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from
set Θ = Θ1 × · · · × ΘI according to probability density φ(·), and each agent
i’s utility function over the outcome x ∈ X given his type θi is ui(x, θi) ∈ R.
A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I strategy sets S1, · · · , SI
and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X. The mechanism combined
with possible types (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI), the probability density φ(·) over the possible
realizations of θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · × ΘI , and utility functions (u1, · · · , uI) defines
a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The strategy function of each
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agent i in the game induced by Γ is a private function si(θi) : Θi → Si. Each
strategy set Si contains agent i’s possible strategies. The outcome function g(·)
describes the rule for how agents’ strategies get turned into a social choice.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ1 × · · · ×ΘI → X that, for
each possible profile of the agents’ types θ1, · · · , θI , assigns a collective choice
f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X.
A strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, ŝi ∈ Si, there
exists
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(g(ŝi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the social choice function
f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism Γ̄ = (S̄1, · · · , S̄I , ḡ(·)) in which S̄i = Θi
for all i and ḡ(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. 6 The social choice function f(·) is
truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive
compatible) if s̄∗
i
(θi) = θi for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the direct mechanism Γ̄ = (S̄1, · · · , S̄I , ḡ(·)), in which S̄i = Θi,
ḡ = f . That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θi ∈ Θi, θ̂i ∈ Θi, there exists
Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θ̂i, θ−i), θi)|θi].
Proposition 23.D.1 [1]: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash E-
quilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that
implements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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